As supreme commander of Allied Forces in Europe and chief strategist of Operation Overlord, Dwight David Eisenhower was one of the most influential figures of World War II. Along with Rommel, Patton, Montgomery, and others, Eisenhower made his mark on the conduct and outcome of the war. His particular skills as a diplomat, however, set him apart from the others. Born to a hardworking Mennonite couple in Kansas, Eisenhower was schooled in the ethic of hard work and strong convictions that shaped his behavior as a commander and a diplomat in years to come.
After finishing high school in Abilene, Kansas, Eisenhower worked to support his brother's education for a year, and then entered the United States Military Academy at West Point. Eisenhower commanded a tank training center in World War I before his assignment to the Panama Canal Zone. He later attended the army's command school, where he graduated first in a class of 275, and was appointed to the Army War College. He served at a variety of posts, including France, where he wrote a guidebook of World War I battlefields, before becoming an aide to Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur. Together they served in the Philippines, where he assisted MacArthur with the reorganization of the commonwealth's army. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Star of the Philippines and earned the rank of lieutenant colonel.
In March of 1941, Eisenhower became a full colonel, and three months later was appointed the chief of staff of the 3rd Army. His role in planning war games for almost 500,000 troops caught the attention of General George C. Marshall, head of President Roosevelt's War Department. Eisenhower's gift for planning poised him for the central stage of his life: when the United States entered World War II, General George C. Marshall appointed him to the U.S. War Plans Division. There he prepared strategy for the Allied invasion of Europe. Promoted to major general in March 1942, with responsibility for the operations division of the War Department, it was only a matter of months before he was named supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces.
The selection of Eisenhower as commander of U.S. troops in Europe came on 24 December 1943. He was chosen over 366 other senior officers, principally because of his ability to persuade, mediate, and instill a sense of optimism in others. These skills served him well during the planning and execution of Overlord. During the Overlord campaign, he was challenged to unify the Allies, arbitrate between the grand egos of other commanders, and make difficult decisions directly affecting thousands of lives. His sense of fairness, willingness to make tough decisions, and shoulder the responsibility for them set him apart from others and catapulted him to greatness.
Forging the armies of several countries into a working team was no small feat. As commander of the successful Operation Torch, the Allied Invasion of French North Africa, Eisenhower oversaw the first major Allied offensive of the war, an amphibious assault that would teach him lessons he would later use in Overlord. When the Americans and British began to feud after the North African Landings, Eisenhower made it clear to the entire Allied command in North Africa that British and American troops were to be treated alike, without prejudice for national origin.
That kind of insistence on working together applied to Eisenhower's relationship with the troops as well. During his command in Europe, the general spent a full third of his time at the front, traveling from place to place to talk with the troops, checking their readiness himself. On the eve of D-Day, Eisenhower spent several hours talking with the U.S. 101st Airborne troops, staying until they began taking off. Only then did he return to his headquarters to follow the progress of the invasion.
When fault has been found with his leadership, it has been only that he may have tried too hard to placate others or seek harmony rather than subordinate others to his will. This criticism is most evident in his relations with other commanders, especially the British. More than a mere contrast of wills and egos, Eisenhower's conflicts with the British stemmed from differences in the methods used by the two governments to communicate with theater and field commanders. The British maintained a steady dialogue between headquarters and field personnel, exerting considerable control over the conduct of a battle. The Americans, on the other hand, gave a theater commander a mission and let him make his own decisions, so long as the effort was successful. Thus, when Eisenhower undertook his command, the British kept up a steady stream of advice, opinions, and observations. It was only natural that Eisenhower would see this as interference, but to his credit, he never let the differences get out of hand. Instead, he brought all his skills of arbitration to the table.
Churchill, Montgomery, and Brooke were particularly troublesome to him. Churchill lectured him interminably on military and political issues. In particular, Churchill felt that Eisenhower's broad-front strategy following D-Day was misguided, arguing instead for a single concentrated thrust. In two long days of discussion on the subject, Eisenhower found every way to say "no" available to him. His gentle persistence prevailed without sacrificing the important relationship between the Allies.
Montgomery, with less capacity for diplomacy than Churchill, argued incessantly over tactics. The two men could hardly have been more different. Eisenhower was open, congenial, and reasonable, inviting participatory decision making; Montgomery was closed, abrupt, and dogmatic, using his staff to gather information for his sole decision making. Montgomery viewed Eisenhower's style as a sign of weakness or inexperience, accusing him of acting more like a football coach than a general. Even when Eisenhower and Montgomery occasionally agreed, each saw in the agreement what they wanted to see and ignored their deeper differences. Though communications could not have been more strained, Eisenhower never allowed the problems to precipitate a breach in the alliance.
While Churchill did not like Eisenhower's politics and Montgomery did not like his tactics, Brooke did not care for the supreme commander's strategy. He, too, took Eisenhower to task for his broad-front strategy to end the war. Despite this, Eisenhower stuck to his guns and was proven right. But even in their memoirs, the two men remember it differently, Eisenhower recalling that Brooke found Eisenhower to be completely right, and Brooke arguing that Eisenhower had congratulated him on a good policy.
Though some questioned Eisenhower's appointment as supreme allied commander at the time, history has shown the choice to be wise. Few men, then or today, have the rare mix of military know-how and diplomatic skills that were necessary to win the war. The truth be known, Eisenhower fought the war on an even broader front than Europe alone: World War II was won by forging alliances that could not be stopped by petty interpersonal battles. It took a diplomatic general to accomplish that feat.
